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A DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE VALIC DECISION
LAURENCE M. JONES t
THE PROBLEM.
PROBABLY the most controversial development in the insurance
business in recent years has been the variable annuity.' Although
it was introduced in this country in 1952 by the Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association (TIAA) when it organized the College
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) in an attempt to provide a retire-
ment plan for teachers which would to some extent compensate for
the inflation of recent years, the variable annuity caused no particular
discussion until some commercial insurance companies proposed to
issue such policies for sale to the general public. Since such proposals
were made there has been a great schism among insurance authorities
regarding the propriety of insurance companies issuing such contracts.
On the one hand are those companies which consider variable annuities
as merely a development of the annuity contract to meet modern situa-
tions and thus a definite part of the traditional insurance business.
The opposition considers annuities as requiring a promise to pay
a fixed sum, and since the amount payable under variable annuities
depends on the returns from investments, such contracts should be
considered as securities and not insurance.2
Actually there are two problems involved: one is whether variable
annuities should be issued by insurance companies or investment
t Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of La*. A.B. 1930, J.D.
1932, State University of Iowa; LL.M. 1933, S.J.D. 1934, Harvard University.
1. Although some have objected to the use of the term variable annuity as
a paradox, it seems to be accepted as the best description of a contract by which a
principal sum and the income earned by it is to be distributed in periodic payments,
the amount of the payments to vary depending on the rate of return actually earned.
See Bellinger, Hagmann, and Martin, The Meaning and Usage of the Word "An-
nuity," 9 J. AM. Soc'y C. L. U. 261 (1955) opposing the use of the term. Compare
Day, A Variable Annuity Is an Annuity, 1955 INs. L.J. 775 favoring the use of the
term. See also HUEBNER AND BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 99-100 (5th ed. 1958) com-
paring traditional and variable annuities.
2. These divergent points of view are illustrated by the following articles in 1956
INs. L.J.: Johnson, The Variable Annuity; What It Is and Why It Is Needed 357;
Kvernland, Some Economic and Investment Aspects of Variable Annuities 373;
Haussermann, The Security in Variable Annuities 382; Long, The Variable Annuity;
A Common Stock Investment Scheme 393; Schechter, Variable Annuities - Boon or
Bane? 764; Pyle, The Case Against Variable Annuities 776. In addition see Day
and Melnikoff, The Variable Annuity as a Life Insurance Company Product, 10 J.
AM. Soc'y C. L. U. 45 (1955); Day, A Variable Annuity Is Not a "Security", 32
NOTRE DAME LAW. 642 (1957); Morrisey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, 35
HARV. Bus. REv. 75 (1957).
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companies, i.e., whether such annuities should be treated as insurance
or securities from the standpoint of economics; the other is whether
such annuities should be treated as insurance or securities for the
purpose of regulation by governmental authorities. Both problems in-
volve the process of classification, the one from the standpoint of the
economics of the insurance business versus the investment business,
while the other is purely a legal matter for the courts and legislature
to decide.
This problem of classification is not new; the courts traditionally
have approached new problems by attempting to classify the situation
before them under one of the accepted concepts and then applying the
rules, principles, and standards applicable to that concept. This approach
becomes difficult, if not impossible, when the new situation involves
elements of several of the traditional concepts; it is like attempting to
fit a square peg into a round hole. The difficulty becomes particularly
acute when, as in the case of the variable annuity, the new situation
has been deliberately created by combining the elements of several
concepts in an attempt to create a new business device. The problem
may arise in many ways; e.g., in determining which principles of the
common law should be applied, in interpreting legislation, or in deciding
how business should be regulated. In each instance the assumption is
that once the proper classification is made the problem will be solved;
this seems to be the fallacy in such an approach. The mere arbitrary
classification of a new situation under an old concept does not necessarily
solve anything; in fact, it may create new problems. The real question
is what body of law should be applied to this situation, or did the
legislature contemplate this sort of transaction when the statute was
passed, or how and by what agency should this business be regulated.
In the variable annuity there is just this sort of situation, a new
type of business transaction which combines some of the elements of
the traditional insurance contract with ideas taken from the investment
business. The immediate question is what agency or agencies are going
to regulate the business of issuing variable annuities.' In the past
the insurance business has been regulated by the states, as opposed to
the federal government, through special administrative agencies. This
is due to the decisions in Paul v. Virginia4 which for seventy-five years
3. The preliminary problem of who should issue such contracts, insurance
companies or investment companies, seems to have been answered; several insurance
companies have issued, or have indicated they are going to issue, such policies.
Apparently no investment company has yet done so. However, some investment
companies offer separate insurance and annuity contracts in connection with their
periodic payment plans.
4. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
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imposed constitutional limitations on the power of the federal govern-
ment to regulate insurance companies. Although these limitations
have now been removed as a result of the decision in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,5 the federal government, with
limited exceptions, has refrained from exercising its power over insur-
ance companies. 6 However, the power is now there, and the conflict
between state and federal regulation is weighted in favor of the federal
government which can, when and if it wishes, appropriate the field. On
the other hand the investment business, the issuing and sale of securi-
ties, has been and is regulated by both state and federal authorities.
The first regulations, the Blue Sky Laws, were state regulations de-
veloped to prevent certain abuses in financing of business organizations.
In recent times the federal government through the Securities and
Exchange Commission has taken over much of the field although it
has not yet completely excluded the states.7
The present problem, therefore, is one of determining who is to
regulate the issuing of variable annuities and the sort of regulations
Which are to me imposed.' It is no longer a question of power since
both the state and federal governments have the power to regulate;
it is simply a matter of policy, more specifically of federal policy, and
at present Congress has determined to leave the regulation of the
insurance business to the states while sharing the regulation of the
investment and securities business with the state agencies. Thus for the
moment it becomes necessary to classify variable annuities as either
insurance or securities in, order to determine by whom and how they
shall be regulated. Before attemping such a classification, it may be
helpful to analyze the concept of insurance, including the traditional
5. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
6. Following the decision in the Southeastern Underwriters case, Congress passed
the McCarran Act, 59 STAT. 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15, which provides that the business
of insurance shall be subject to the laws of the several states, and, with certain
exceptions, no act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate or supersede any
law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance
unless such act specifically relates to insurance. Exceptions are also made in the
Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a, and the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 for the purpose of exempting insurance
companies from the operation of these acts.
7. For a good discussion of the history and background of the regulation of
the issuance of securities in England and America see Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION ch. I (1951); ch. II deals with state regulation of securities and ch. III with
the federal regulations, such as the Securities Act of 1933, the Security Exchange
Act of 1934, and the Investment Act of 1940. See also Loss AND CowtTT, BLUE SKY
LAWS ch. I (1958).
8. The specific question before the court in the VALIC decision, to be discussed
later, was somewhat more limited. It was whether the respondents had to register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933 and
comply with the Investment Company Act of 1940 before offering their variable
annuity contracts to the public. However, it is the broader aspect of the problem
which has attracted so much attention and caused so much discussion.
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fixed-sum annuity, note how the insurance business is regulated and
the purpose of such regulation, and then compare the investment and
securities business and the manner in which it is regulated in order
to determine which is more nearly like the variable annuity and which
sort of regulation will better protect the public.
THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE.
It is difficult to give a simple definition of insurance which will
cover all phases of the business, but essentially it is a contract whereby
one party, the insurer, agrees to indemnify another for a loss suffered
as the result of a fortuitous event. Insurance is a type of risk-shifting de-
vice which normally involves the collection of a fund from many persons
subject to the same risk, and from the fund so collected those persons
who suffer a loss are reimbursed. In the case of life insurance, which
is the type of insurance in which we are interested, the fund is collected
from the premiums charged policy holders. The risk insured against
is the chance of an early death; the uncertainty is the time of the loss
(death), not the loss. Since in life insurance, other than term insur-
ance, the eventual loss (death) is certain, the total of the premiums
charged plus the interest which will be earned, minus the expenses,
must equal the face value of the policies at maturity. The amount of
the premiums is determined by past experience (losses) as reflected in
the mortality tables, anticipated earnings (interest), and the cost
of operation (expenses). Thus life insurance consists of collecting sums
of money (premiums) from the policy holders which will, over a
period of years, equal the face value of the policies at maturity. By
combining many individual risks into a group and using the mortality
tables the uncertainty, in the case of the individual, can be made
certain in the case of the group; life insurance can thus be placed
on a scientific and economically feasible basis.
An annuity contract, on the other hand, involves just the opposite
type of calculations, for an annuity is an agreement to pay out a sum
of money, plus earnings, in a series of installments. The problem is
9. There are as many definitions of insurance as there are attempts to define the
term, and most writers, either before or after stating their definition, attempt to
explain in some detail the meaning of the terms used. Professor Patterson has noted
that what constitutes insurance may be different for different purposes, and thus
we must know what the problem is before attempting to define the term. PATTERSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 2 (3d ed. 1955). This is a particularly apt
comment in relation to the present problem which, as Mr. Justice Douglas pointed
out, is whether the term insurance as used in certain federal statutes includes the
concept of variable annuities. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 79 Sup. Ct.
618, 620-21 (1959). The Securities and Exchange Commission will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as SEC and the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company as VALIC;
the case will be cited as SEC v. VALIC.
[VOL. 5 : p. 407
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to determine how much money it is necessary to have on hand at the
start to insure the continuance of the installments throughout the period
during which payments are to be made. This, as previously stated, is
just the reverse of life insurance but involves the same type of calcula-
tions. In the case of a life annuity the mortality tables must be used, the
anticipated earnings must be determined, and the expenses must be
deducted. Thus annuities have always been considered as a legitimate
part of the insurance business." A simple comparison of life insurance
and annuities may be made in the case of single-premium policies. In
life insurance the amount of the premium must be sufficient, together
with the interest it will earn in the future, to equal the face value of the
policy at maturity plus the cost of operation. In an annuity the amount
of the single premium must be sufficient, together with the interest
which will be earned in the future, to equal the sum of the installments
to be paid plus the expenses. Thus both life insurance and annuities
involve the same type of calculations to place them on a scientific and
economic basis. In both instances the insurer makes a definite promise;
in both the insurer takes the risk of poor mortality experience, fluctua-
tion in the interest rate, and higher than anticipated expenses."
THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES.
Up to the present time the regulation of insurance companies
and of the insurance business has been left almost entirely to the states.
This is due to the historical accident of the decision in the case of
Paul v. Virginia.2 By placing constitutional limitations on the power
of the federal government to regulate the insurance business, it left
the states as the only effective political organization which could
exercise control. Regulation developed because of abuses which oc-
curred in the early days of the business and is still required because
of the size of the business and its influence on the economic structure
of society." The growth of life insurance in the United States in
modern times has created a relatively few large companies with tre-
mendous assets which must be invested properly if the companies are
to be operated according to sound economic principles. Actually, these
large sums represent money collected from policy holders which is to
10. HUEBNER AND BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE ch. 8 (5th ed. 1958). MACLEAN,
Ln'E INSURANCE ch. 3 (8th ed. 1957).
11. Ibid. See also Bellinger, Harmann, and Martin, The Meaning and Usage of
the Word "Annuity," 9 J. AM. Soc'v C. L. U. 261, 268 (1955).
12. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
13. For the story of the scandals which led to the investigation by Charles
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be paid back to them when the policies mature. The policy holders,
therefore, have an interest in how these funds are managed and the
investment of them is of great concern to the government. It is im-
portant to make certain that proper reserves are provided and to see
that the investments are the sort which will conserve the principal and
produce the income required to pay claims as the policies mature. Since
the policies mature slowly at long periods in the future, the types
of investments required are long-term, fixed-sum, interest-bearing
obligations. Thus the first regulations were designed to insure the
sound economic organization and operation of the companies; this
was accomplished by regulating the capital structure, requiring
maintenance of proper reserves, and limiting the type of investments
which might be made by insurance companies. 14 More recently the
licensing of agents has been required in order to prevent fraud and
misrepresentation; the terms of the policies have been regulated; and, in
some types of insurance, the rates to be charged are set.15 The history
of governmental control of the insurance business and the type of
regulations imposed indicate that the primary purpose is to insure that
the companies will be organized and operated on an actuarially sound
basis, and that the public will not be misinformed when dealing with
insurance agents.
THE INVESTMENT BUSINESS - SECURITIES.
In the early history of this country the investments available con-
sisted primarily of real estate mortgages and the obligations of mu-
nicipal, state and federal governments. When the corporate form
of organization became the typical business arrangement, other types of
investments appeared. Corporate bonds representing debt type in-
vestments, and stocks representing equity or ownership investments be-
came common. However, it was not until very recently that the small
investor became an important factor in the securities market; this is
especially true in the case of corporate stocks. The modern development
which has brought thousands of small investors into the securities
market is the mutual fund. These funds operate by selling shares to
the individual investor, taking the money contributed by the share-
holders and reinvesting it in corporate securities, usually common
stocks.' 6 These securities are held in the fund and the dividends re-
14. See PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANcE LAW §§ 3, 4 (2d ed. 1957).
15. Id. §§ 5, 6, 7, 8.
16. There are now many types of mutual funds; some are the "closed-end" type
in which only a limited number of shares are issued, while others are "open-end"
in which an unlimited number of new shares may be issued. In certain funds the
[VOL. 5 : p. 407
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ceived from them are in turn distributed to the shareholders. At
regular intervals, for example, monthly, the value of the shares is de-
termined by dividing the value of the total assets held by the fund by
the number of outstanding shares; new shares may be bought or sold
at this price until the next valuation period."
The purpose of such funds is to give the small investor an oppor-
tunity to secure a fair return on his money and share in the growth of
the economic system while receiving professional management of his
funds. By regularly investing small amounts in the shares of a mutual
fund, the average individual is able to secure many of the advantages,
including diversification, heretofore available only to the large investor.
Of course, the investor in a mutual fund runs the risk of a partial or
complete loss of his money if the management of the fund is poor; the
risk of the investment is on the participants in a mutual fund. However,
the experience of the funds has been very good. 8
THE REGULATION OF THE INVESTMENT BUSINESS.
The rapid expansion of business and the promotion of corporations
in this country at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth centuries brought scandals and misuse of the funds of the
investors which resulted in the passage of the first regulatory laws,
the so-called Blue Sky Laws. 9 These were state statutes, and the
control and regulation of business corporations remained almost ex-
clusively a state function until after the business depression in the
thirties. The early laws were mostly of the anti-fraud type, designed
investments are balanced between equity and debt type investments; in others the
investments are limited to those which are picked for the purpose of assuring a
steady income, while still others choose investments with the idea of securing
capital gains. In some funds the investments are limited to business engaged in
certain types of activities, such as electronics or drugs. For a general discussion of
mutual funds see Carter, Mutual Investment Funds, 27 HARV. Bus. Rzv. 715 (1949).
17. There are certain charges made by the operators of the fund to cover
management expenses and the price at which new shares are offered for sale is
somewhat higher than the redemption price at which the fund repurchases shares
from shareholders. Ibid. Part of the government's objection to the variable annuity
contracts issued by VALIC was based on the fact that the charges deducted from
the premiums paid by the policyholders exceeded the amounts which investment
companies are allowed to charge as management fees. See SEC's brief at 22-23, 29,
SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959).
18. For example, the net asset value of one share in the Massachusetts In-
vestors Trust has increased from $3.81 at the time shares were first offered on
July 15, 1924, to $13.46 on Sept. 30, 1959. The year-end values at five-year
intervals are as follows: 1924 - $4.04; 1929 - $6.84; 1934 - $3.13; 1939 - $3.50;
1944 - $3.90; 1949 - $4.61; 1954 - $9.33. Massachusetts Investors Trust, 141st
Quarterly Report, Sept. 30, 1959.
19. See Loss AND COW'rv, BLUE SKY LAWS ch. I (1958) giving the history and
background of the Blue Sky Laws; also Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. I (1951)
for a history of securities legislation in England and America, and ch. II for a
discussion of state regulation of securities.
SPRING 1960]
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to require full disclosure of all the pertinent facts relating to the issu-
ance of the securities and to prevent fraudulent representations being
made to the purchasers. These were followed by statutes requiring
the registration and regulation of persons engaging in the business of
selling securities, and finally by acts requiring the registration of the
securities themselves. 2  However, the losses resulting from the failure
of businesses in the depression period of the thirties, the scandals which
followed the disclosures that securities had been issued and sold without
adequate value behind them, and that fraudulent representations had
been made to the purchasers caused the federal government to enter
the field of security regulation. It was quite obvious that the state
Blue Sky Laws with their varyyng requirements could not adequately
control the evils because of the interstate nature of the business, the
variation in the acts, and the laxity of enforcement in many instances. 2
The first of the federal regulations was the Securities Act of 193312
which combined disclosure requirements with anti-fraud measures.
This was followed by the Securities and Exchange of 193423 which
created the Securities and Exchange Commission and provided for the
regulation of the securities market. Later came the Investment Com-
pany Act of 19404 which dealt directly with the regulation of mutual
funds. It requires the registration of such companies, a statement of
their plans regarding diversification, borrowing, lending, underwriting,
and investment policies. The act is designed to accomplish five ob-
jectives: ( 1) regulate selling practices, (2) provide honest and unbiased
management, (3) assure participation in the management by the share-
holders, (4) provide adequate and feasible capital structures, and (5)
require financial statements and accounting to security holders. From
the definitions and exceptions included in these acts it is clear that
mutual funds are subject to the controls therein provided unless they
are expressly excepted. The purpose of the regulations imposed by
these acts is to require anyone issuing or selling securities to make a full
disclosure of all pertinent facts so that an interested investor may have
20. Most modern acts combine all three types of provisions. Ibid.
21, Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS ch. III (1951). The Uniform Securities
Act is designed to overcome the objection that state statutes may vary from
state to state; however, in view of the variations in the so-called uniform acts
which have been enacted by various states it is doubtful if it will entirely accomplish
that objective. See note 63 infra.
22. 48 STAT. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a. This statute will be referred to, as the
Securities Act.
23. 48 STAT. 881; 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
24. 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1. This statute will be referred to as the In-
vestment Company Act. For a good discussion of this act see Note, The Investment
Company Act of 1940, 41 COLUM. L. Rtv. 269 (1941). There are, of course, other
federal statutes regulating the offering and issuance of securities, but these are
the ones which are involved in the present controversy.
[VOL. 5 : p. 407
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1960], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol5/iss3/3
THE VALIC DECISION
an opportunity to decide for himself whether to take the risk involved
in making the investment.
THE VARIABLE ANNUITY.
A variable annuity differs from a traditional annuity in that the
amounts received by the annuitant may vary from period to period."5
Assuming the annuity is paid monthly, this means the income received
by the annuitant may vary from month to month depending on the
investment experience of the issuing company and how often the annuity
is revalued. 6 Thus the annuitant runs the risk of the investment policies
of the issuing company and conceivably might receive no income if the
investments proved worthless. On the other hand, if the investments
are highly successful and produce a large return his payments will
increase accordingly. Actually the companies issuing variable annuities
assume an anticipated interest rate in evaluating their contracts, and
only in so far as their experience varies from the anticipated rate will
there be any fluctuation. If their experience continues to be as good
as that of the mutual funds, the holders of the variable annuities run
very little risk of complete loss of income although there will be some
variation depending on business conditions.2"
The variation in the amounts payable under a variable annuity
occurs because the insurer does not contract to pay a definite sum
(enter into a debt obligation) but puts the premiums into an accumu-
lation fund which is in turn invested in common stocks. During the
25. There have always been annuities in which the actual amount received by the
annuitant has varied; e.g., participating annuities in which the amount payable
varies depending on the income earned by the company and its mortality experience.
See MACLEAN, LimE INSURANCE 57-58 (1957). However, the variation in such
instances is more or less incidental, and is the result of sharing in a favorable
investment experience without any risk of loss to the annuitant if the experience
should be unfavorable to the company. Such contracts are quite different from
the variable annuities issued by VALIC. SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 631-2
(1959) ; Maclean, supra at 55-56.
26. CREF apparently determines the value of its annuity units on a yearly
basis while VALIC seems to use a monthly basis. This means that the amount
received by the annuitant each month will remain constant throughout the year
under a CREF annuity but will vary each month under a VALIC contract. See
THE BIRTH AND WORTH OF A CREF ANNUITY UNIT, pamphlet issued by CREF. See
also SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 630 n. 28 (1959). During the pay-in
period both companies revalue the accumulation units monthly. SEC v. VALIC,
supra at 628; CREF pamphlet, supra.
27. VALIC uses an annuity table which assumes an interest rate of 3y2%.
SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 630 (1959) ; VALIC's brief at 9-10, SEC v. VALIC,
supra.
28. The value of an annuity unit and the payments under the annuities issued by
CREF have varied as follows: Initial value - $10; 1953-54 - $9.46; 1954-55 -
$10.74; 1955-56 - $14.11; 1956-57 - $18.51; 1957-58 - $16.88; 1958-59 - $16.71;
1959-60 - $22.03. See GREENOUGH AND KING, RETIREMENT AND INSURANCE PLANS IN
AMERICAN COLLEGES 40 (1959).
SPRING 1960]
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accumulation period' an annuitant is credited with a certain number
of accumulation units each time he pays a premium; the number will
depend on the value of a unit, and the value of a unit varies from period
to period. To determine the value of an accumulation unit for any
period, the insurer tabulates the total value of all the stocks held by the
fund and divides this value by the total number of outstanding accumu-
lation units.8s During this pay-in period the accumulation units which
the annuitant receives in return for his premiums represent his share
in the accumulation fund and are quite similar to shares in a mutual
fund. If there are no restrictions on the transfer or sale of the ac-
cumulation units or if there are no insurance features incorporated in the
contract this similarity is very great. On the other hand, if the sale
or transfer of the units is restricted or if the variable annuity contract
also includes some life insurance protection or waiver of premium
benefits, the similarity is not so great."1
When the time arrives for the annuity payments to begin (the pay-
out period), the accumulation units are converted into annuity units.
At this point the variable annuity begins to look more like the traditional
annuity and less like a share in a mutual fund. To determine the num-
ber of annuity units to which an annuitant is entitled, the value of his
accumulation units is first determined; then by the use of the mortality
tables and the application of actuarial science it is possible to determine
how many annuity units can be paid to the annuitant monthly for life.s"
The annuitant is thus assured of an income which he cannot outlive, as in
the case of a traditional fixed-sum annuity, and which will over the
period of his life liquidate the value of his accumulation units. These
29. The discussion assumes that the contract calls for a deferred annuity in
which the cost of the annuity is paid not in a lump sum but by making a series of pay-
ments over a period of time. These premiums are invested and the interest earned is
accumulated and added to the principal until the time arrives for the annuity
payments to begin. At that time the sum accumulated must be sufficient to pur-
chase an immediate annuity of the amount desired.
30. See SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 628 n. 25 (1959); THi BIRTH AND
WORTH OF A CREF ANNUITY UNIT, pamphlet issued by CREF.
31. Under the CREF plan the annuity contracts are not transferable, have no
cash surrender value, and do not provide waiver of premium or other insurance
features. Failure to pay premiums does not terminate the contract, but premium
payments may be resumed only after a lapse of five years except in limited
circumstances. YOUR RETIREM NT ANNUITY 6-7, pamphlet issued by TIAA (1959).
The VALIC contracts include five-year declining-term life insurance benefits, a
grace period for the payment of premiums, cash surrender and loan provisions,
and waiver of premium benefits at any time prior to the commencement of the
annuity payments. SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 627-30 (1959); VALIC's
brief at 21-23, SEC v. VALIC, supra. The proposed Prudential plan apparently
contains very few insurance features and limited surrender rights. Day and Melnikoff,
The Variable Annuity as a Life Insurance Company Product, 10 J. AM. Soc'Y C. L. U.
45 (1955).
32. This determination takes into account the mortality factor. See SEC v.
VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 630 n. 28 (1959) ; THs BIRTH AND WORTH O9 A CREF
ANNUITY UNIT, pamphlet issued by CREF.
416 [VOL. 5 : p. 407
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payments will expend both the principal and income of the fund, rather
than merely distributing the earnings as in the case of shares in a
mutual fund, and this constitutes the principal difference between a
variable annuity and a mutual fund. This arrangement whereby both
the principal and income of a fund are to be paid out in a series ol
installments can be accomplished only by actuarial calculations which
take account of the mortality factor.
Once the number of annuity units is determined it remains constant
during the pay-out period; however, the actual income in dollars received
by the annuitant may vary from period to period. This variation occurs
because the value of an annuity unit changes from period to period and
reflects the investment experience of the annuity fund, just as the value
of an accumulation unit varies during the pay-in period and depends on
the investment experience of the accumulation fund. To determine the
value of an annuity unit for any period the current market value of all
the investments held by the annuity fund is divided by the total number
of annuity units outstanding. By multiplying the number of annuity
units owed to any annuitant by the value of one unit the actual income
payable to that annuitant can be determined. How often the value of the
annuity unit is determined will depend on the practice of the particulai
company,"3 but once the annuity option has been selected and the pay-out
period has begun, it is no longer possible for the annuitant to withdraw
from the plan or liquidate his units by "cashing in" his holdings; he is
completely "locked in" and is dependent on the management and in-
vestment policies of the company for his protection. It was this
feature of the plan which convinced the concurring Justices in the
VALIC decision that the owner of a variable annuity needed the pro-
tection of the federal statutes regulating investment companies as much
as, or even more than, a shareholder in a mutual fund.3 4
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION.
It is now necessary to consider the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Company of America."3 The action was instituted by the
SEC36 to enjoin VALIC T from offering its variable annuity contracts
to the public without registering them under the Securities Act of
33. See note 26 supra.
34. SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 631 (1959).
35. 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959); 28 FORDHAM L. Rtv. 379 (1959); 1959 WASH.
U.L.Q. 206.
36. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) was allowed
to intervene as a petitioner. SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 619 n. 1 (1959).
37. The Equity Annuity Life Insurance Company (EALIC) was allowed to
intervene as a respondent. Ibid.
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19338 and without complying with the Investment Company Act of
1940.11 The District Court denied relief4" and the Court of Appeals
affirmed ;41 the Supreme Court reversed in a five to four decision in
which only three Justices joined in the majority opinion, two others
concurring in a separate opinion. The majority, if one can thus describe
the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, held that the federal statutes were
applicable, that the contracts offered by the respondents did not con-
stitute insurance as commonly understood because there was no risk-
taking, and that the respondents did not come within the provisions
exempting insurance contracts and insurance companies from the federal
regulations. The concurring Justices considered the intent and purpose
of Congress in passing the legislation and the actual operation of the
respondents' contracts in holding that their activities came within the
scope of the statutes. The dissent, on the other hand, found nothing in
the federal acts indicating an intent on the part of Congress to change
our traditional policy of leaving the regulation of insurance to the
states,42 and feeling that variable annuities are a bona fide development
in the field of insurance, held that they should be exempt from the
regulations.
Even though both the Securities Act and the Investment Company
Act contain provisions exempting insurance and insurance companies,4"
the majority held them applicable to the variable annuities issued by
the respondents. Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that these are federal
statutes and the term insurance as used in them is a matter for the
federal courts to interpret. Since state courts and insurance com-
missioners had taken different views regarding variable annuity con-
tracts, he concluded there was no uniform meaning which could be
implied from the use of the term insurance in the federal acts. Mr.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, replied:
38. 48 STAT. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a.
39. 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1.
40. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 521 (1957); 43
CORNEML L. Q. 517 (1958) ; 26 Geo. WASH. L. Rnv. 344 (1958) ; 46 G4o. L. J. 542
(1958); 71 HARV. L. REv. 562 (1958); 56 MICH. L. Rxv. 656 (1958); 33 N. Y. U. L.
REv. 76 (1958); 106 U. PA. L. REv. 483 (1958); 11 VAND. L. Rnv. 1453 (1958);
4 VILL. L. REv. 147 (1958).
41. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 257 F.2d 201 (1958); 32 TEMP.
L. Q. 121 (1958).
42. See note 6 supra.
43. Section 3 (a) (8) of the Securities Act, supra note 38, provides that the
provisions of the act shall not apply to any insurance or endowment policy or
annuity contract issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner of any state. Section 3 (c) (3) of the Investment Company Act,
supra note 39, provides that an insurance company is not an investment company
within the meaning of the act; Section 2 (a) (17) of the same act defines an insur-
ance company as a company which is organized as an insurance company, whose
predominant business activity is the writing of insurance, and which is subject
to supervision by the insurance commissioner of a state.
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"I can find nothing in the history of the Securities Act of 1933
which savors in the slightest degree of a purpose to depart from
or dilute this traditional federal 'hands off' policy respecting in-
surance regulations. On the contrary, the exemption of insurance
from that Act, which is couched in the broadest terms, reflected
not merely adherence to tradition but also compliance with a sup-
posed command of the Constitution.""
And with respect to the Investment Company Act, he stated:
"Similarly, I can find nothing in the history of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 which points in any way to a change in
federal policy on this score. Here tradition, perhaps more than
constitutional doubt, explains the exemption of insurance com-
panies from the Act."45
In referring to the provisions exempting insurance and insurance com-
panies from the effect of the federal acts, the concurring Justices said:
"Except for these exclusions, there is little doubt that these con-
tracts and the companies issuing them would be subject to the
Federal Acts."46
Thus we are brought to the determining question which is whether
variable annuity contracts are to be considered insurance within the
meaning of these federal statutes. In reaching their decisions the
various Justices considered the nature and purpose of the variable
annuity, its investment and insurance features, and all of them recog-
nized that it contained some elements of insurance. The majority stated:
"In some respects the variable annuity has the characteristics
of the fixed and conventional annuity; they continue until the
annuitant's death or in case other options are chosen until the
end of a fixed term or until the death of the last of two persons;
payments are made both from principal and income; and the
amounts vary according to the age and sex of the annuitant. More-
over, actuarily both the fixed-dollar annuity and the variable
annuity are calculated by identical principles. Each issuer assumes
the risk of mortality from the moment the contract is issued. That
risk is an actuarial prognostication that a certain number of an-
nuitants will survive to specified ages. Even if a substantial num-
ber live beyond their predicted demise, the company issuing the
annuity - whether it be fixed or variable - is obligated to make
the annuity payments on the basis of the mortality prediction re-
flected in the contract. This is the mortality -risk assumed both
by respondents and by those who issue fixed annuities. It is this
44. SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 635 (1959).
45. Id. at 636.
46. Id. at 623.
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feature, common to both, that respondents stress when they urge
that this is basically an insurance device. ' 47
The concurring Justices agreed that the contracts contained insurance
features:
"Obviously they have elements of conventional insurance, even
apart from the fixed-dollar term life insurance and the disability
waiver of premium insurance sold with some of these contracts
(both of which are quite incidental to the main undertaking).
They patently contain a significant annuity feature (unless one
defines an annuity as a contract necessarily providing fixed-sum
payments), and the granting of annuities has been considered part
of the business of life insurance. '48
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the dissent, put it even stronger:
"It is certainly beyond question that the 'mortality' aspect of
these annuities - that is the assumption by the company of the
entire risk of longevity - involves nothing other than classic
insurance concepts and procedures, and I do not understand how
that feature can be said to be 'not substantial,' determining as
it does, apart from options, the commencement and duration of
annuity payments to the policyholder."4
But in spite of these features a majority of the Justices held the federal
statutes applicable.
Other features of the contracts convinced the court that companies
issuing variable annuities should be subject to the regulatory provisions
of the federal acts. These features are: (1) the premiums paid by the
anuitants are to be invested in equity securities, primarily common
stocks; and (2) the benefit payments will vary with the results of the
investment policy of the company; no investment risk is taken by the
company. During the pay-in period the position of the annuitant is
quite similar to that of a shareholder in an investment company; this
was recognized by all the Justices. The majority opinion stated:
"The difficulty is that, absent some guarantee of fixed income,
the variable annuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant,
none on the company. The holder gets only a pro rata share of
what the portfolio of equity interests reflects - which may be a
lot, a little, or nothing." 50
The concurring Justices indicated the same attitude:
"But the point is that, even though these contracts contain, for
what they are worth, features of traditional annuity contracts, ad-
47. Id. at 621.
48. Id. at 627.
49. Id. at 634-5.
50. Id. at 621-2.
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ministering them also involves a very substantial and in fact pre-
dominant element of the business of an investment company, and
that in a way totally foreign to the business of a traditional life
insurance and annuity company, as traditionally regulated by state
law. This is what leads to the conclusion that it is not within the
intent of the 1933 and 1940 statutes to exempt them."'"
Again the same Justices said:
"But what the investor is participating in during this period,
despite its acknowledged 'insurance' features, is something quite
similar to a conventional open-end management investment com-
pany, under a periodic investment plan."52
Even the dissent admits the similarity:
"On the other hand it cannot be denied that the investment policies
underlying these annuities, and the stake of the annuities in their
success or failure, place the insurance company in a position
closely resembling that of a company issuing certificates in a periodic
payment plan.""8
Viewing the respondent's operations as essentially similar to those
of a mutual fund investment company, Mr. Justice Brennan concludes
that the regulatory provisions of the Securities and Investment Company
Acts should apply. He reaches this conclusion after examining the
purpose of the federal regulations and comparing them with state in-
surance regulations. The latter, he believes, are designed primarily to
guarantee the economic soundness of traditional insurance companies,
the solvency and adequacy of reserves to meet the company's fixed-
debt obligations. Where the only obligation of the company to pay
is dependent upon the results of its investment policies, a different
sort of regulation is required:
"But the situation changes where the coin of the company's obli-
gation is not money but is rather the present condition of its
investment portfolio. To this extent, the historic functions of
state insurance regulation become meaningless. Prescribed limi-
tations on investment and examination of solvency and reserves
become perfectly circular to the extent that there is no obligation
to pay except in terms measured by one's portfolio....
"In this sort of operation, examination by state insurance officials
to determine the adequacy of reserves and solvency becomes less
and less meaningful. The disclosure policy of the Securities Act
of 1933 becomes, by comparison, more and more relevant. And the
detailed protections of the 1940 legislation - disclosure of invest-
51. Id. at 627.
52. Id. at 629.
53. Id. at 635.
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ment policy, regulation of changes of that policy, or capital struc-
ture, conflicts of interest, investment advisers - all become
relevant in an acute way here. These are the basic protections
that Congress intended investors to have when they put their
money into the hands of an investment trust; there is no adequate
substitute for them in the traditional regulatory controls adminis-
tered by state insurance departments, because these controls are
not relevant to the specific regulatory problems of an investment
trust."'
And this is true under a variable annuity even after the pay-out period
begins:
".. . [T]he investor, during the pay-out period, is in almost every
way as much a participant in something equivalent to an investment
trust as before. . . . [T]he individual payment is still a payment
measured basically in the same way as one's interest in an invest-
ment trust is measured. And in a very real sense the investor is
more vitally interested in the investment experience of the company
at this period than he ever was in the pay-in period ... [because]
he has become completely 'locked in'."5
For this reason Mr. Justice Brennan concludes:
"It is not rational to say that Congress abandoned the very ap-
propriate protections of the Investment Company Act in this
investor's case in favor of provisions of state regulation that are
quite irrelevant to the basic problem of protecting him."56
Since variable annuity contracts contain both insurance and investment
features, and since the latter are an important element, a majority of the
Justices held that the regulatory provisions of the Securities and Invest-
ment Company Acts should apply.
The dissenting Justices also recognized that variable annuity con-
tracts contain both insurance and security features, but felt that "analysis
by fragmentization is at best a hazardous business", and finding nothing
in the federal acts to indicate that Congress intended to abandon the
"traditional federal 'hands off' policy respecting insurance regulation"
or to provide for concurrent regulation by both state and federal
authorities, concluded that the respondents did not have to comply
with the federal statutes. 7 They did, however, suggest that if ex-
perience indicates federal control is desirable Congress could so provide.
54. Id. at 625, 629.
55. Id. at 631.
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at 635, 637. The concurring Justices also recognized that classifying
the contracts as insurance or securities did not solve the problem when they said:
"It is rather meaningless to view the problem as one of pigeonholing these contracts
in one category or the other." Id. at 627.
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The immediate problem before the court was whether the respond-
ents had to comply with the terms of the Securities Act and the Invest-
ment Company Act and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, but in a broader sense the problem was, and still is,
whether federal or state agencies are to regulate the issuing of variable
annuities. It is the broader aspect of the problem which has attracted
so much attention and caused NASD and EALIC to intervene in the
case, and it is with this larger aspect that the Justices seemed to be
principally concerned. Although they deny that the problem can be
solved by merely classifying variable annuities as insurance or securities,
that is essentially how they went about solving it. And one cannot
quarrel too much with their conclusion that variable annuities should
be considered as securities rather than insurance for, as has been pointed
out, they are in many respects similar to shares in a mutual fund.
On the other hand, it is also true that they contain substantial insurance
features and could easily be so classified, as the dissenting Justices did.
Thus on a purely conceptual basis either result may be sustained. But
classifying the annuities as securities and subjecting them to the federal
regulations does not really solve the basic problem which is a matter
of policy - who should regulate such business, and what type of regu-
lations should be imposed? The majority of the Justices answered
these questions by leaving the regulation to the federal authorities and
allowing them to impose the type of regulations designed for securities,
and then suggesting that perhaps Congress might wish to make changes:
"If there is deemed wise any adjustment of the regulatory scheme
in the light of new developments in the subject matter to which it
extends, Congress may make it.""8
The dissent would have left the regulation to the state insurance authori-
ties with a similar suggestion:
"If the innovation of federal control is nevertheless to be desired,
it is for the Congress not this Court, to effect." 59
Thus neither side seemed to be too sure of its position and hedged
by suggesting that Congress could change the result if that were
58. Id. at 633. Part of VALIC's objection to federal regulation was based
on the premise that the present laws, if applied, would prohibit them from issuing
variable annuities. VALIC's brief at 51-53, SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618
(1959). While recognizing that this argument has some validity, the concurring
Justices expressed doubt whether such a result would necessarily follow. SEC v.
VALIC, supra, at 632-33. This may be the reason for the suggestion concerning the
possible need for "adjustment" in the laws.
59. SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 637 (1959).
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deemed desirable. This in effect still leaves open the broad question
of who should regulate this type of business and the sort of regulations
which should be applied.
Prior to the decision by the Supreme Court, most of the opinions
seemed to favor treating variable annuities as insurance, thus making
them subject to regulation by the state insurance authorities."e This is
what the insurance companies contended for and what they seem to
desire"' in spite of the fact that it means regulation by approximately
fifty different agencies with varying requirements and standards. For
companies doing a nationwide business it would seem much more de-
sirable to have a single federal agency regulating the conduct of their
business. However, to insure such a result it would be necessary for
the federal government to appropriate the field, a result which does not
necessarily follow from the fact of federal regulation. For example,
the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the regu-
lation of the issuance of securities by federal authorities have not
abolished state regulatory bodies; the Blue Sky Laws still remain and
are enforced by the states.8 2 The actual result of the present decision,
therefore, is that insurance companies issuing variable annuity policies
must comply with the state insurance laws and regulations, the federal
Securities and Investment Company Acts, and in addition, perhaps,
the state Blue Sky Laws." Thus it is possible that such a company
60. See the following articles and comments, all of which conclude that a
variable annuity is more like insurance than a security, and, therefore, should
not be subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission: Becker,
Variable Annuity Contracts: Insurance or Securities?, 1958 INs. L. J. 612; Day
and Melnikoff, The Variable Annuity as a Life Insurance Company Product, 10 J.
AM. Soc'y C. L. U. 45 (1955); Day, A Variable Annuity Is Not a "Security," 32
NOrRS DAms LAW. 642 (1957); Schechter, Variable Annuities - Boon or Bane?,
1956 INs. L. J. 674; Note, The Classification and Regulation of Variable Annuities,
42 MINN. L. Rev. 1115 (1958); Note, Regulation and Taxation of the Variable
Annuity, 33 ST. JOHN'S L. Rev. 118 (1958); Note, Variable Annuity; Security or
Annuity?, 43 VA. L. Rev. 699 (1957); Comment, 33 N. Y. U. L. Rzv. 76 (1958).
Compare the following article by the counsel for the NASD giving the history and
background of the litigation and presenting the opposite view: Dorsey, The Place
of "Variable Annuities" in Law and Economics, 34 NorRE DAMS LAW. 489 (1959).
61. For some unknown reason the insurance companies seem to be opposed
to federal regulation, and have expressed the fear that federal regulation of variable
annuities might be the first step toward regulation of the entire insurance business.
Long, The Variable Annuity; A Common Stock Investment Scheme, 1956 INS. L. J.
393, 401. See also McConnell, State Regulation v. State Regulation plus Regulation
by Multiple, Decentralized, Independent Federal Agencies, Id. at 697.
62. See Loss, SSCURITISS REGULATION ch. II (1951); Loss AND Cowtvr, BLUE
SKY LAWS ch. VI (1958) ; Smith, State "Blue Sky" Laws and the Federal Securities
Acts, 34 MicH. L. Rev. 1135 (1936) ; Smith, The Relation of Federal and State
Securities Laws, 4 LAW & CONTUMP. PROB. 241 (1937) ; Wright, Correlation of State
Blue Sky Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L. Q. 258 (1941).
63. The Uniform Securities Act as originally drafted specifically excepted in-
surance and endowment policies and annuity contracts where the company promised
to pay a fixed-dollar amount. § 401 (1) and § 402 (a) (5). This language was
used so as not to exempt variable annuities. Commissioners Note, § 401 (1) and§ 402 (a) (5). See Loss AND CowTT, BLuE SKY LAWS 350-51 (1958). However,
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might have to comply with regulations issued by nearly one hundred
different administrative agencies. This seems an intolerable burden
to impose on any business. The alternative is federal regulation of all
interstate insurance activities including variable annuities. By having
one regulatory body it would be possible to eliminate the overlapping,
varying, and often inconsistent policies and regulations now promulgated
by the various state agencies. Uniform and consistent policies and
regulations could be provided; a conscious and intelligent choice could
be made as to the type of regulations which should be imposed and
whether the emphasis should be on disclosure, regulation of the details
of operations, or both. And once such policies were adopted there
would be uniformity in enforcement across the country; all persons
would receive the benefits and protections afforded by the regulations. 4
It seems, therefore, in view of the unsatisfactory situation which
has resulted from the decisions in the variable annuities case, that
Congress should re-examine the whole problem of the regulation
of insurance companies and the business of insurance and make a
conscious and considered determination whether to leave such regulation
with the states or to place it under a federal board and whether to
include variable annuities or treat them as securities. This is an
important matter of policy and should be determined by Congress
after proper investigation and deliberation rather than incidentally
as the result of a five to four decision by the Supreme Court in a case
in which the real and basic question and the issues of policy were not
before the court.
the act was subsequently amended (1958) so as to leave the question whether variable
annuities should be regulated as securities or insurance to the determination of each
state enacting the uniform act. See HANDBOOK Olt THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 135, 257-58 (1958).
64. Where the regulation is left to the states there are bound to be variations
in the statutory provisions, and perhaps, even greater variation in the manner in
which the statutes and regulations are enforced. See PATTERSON, ESSE-NTIALS Olt
INSURANc. LAW § 1 at 1 (2d ed. 1957) where Professor Patterson says: "One
cannot speak of a single set of regulations of insurers, but only of 49 separate sets."
And speaking of legislative control, he states: "The quality of draftsmanship in
insurance legislation still varies considerably as between the several states. . . . State
legislation regulates not only hundreds of interstate insurers doing business across
state lines but also thousands of small mutual insurers that do business only in one
state. For the latter, diversity of legislation presents no problem, but for the interstate
insurers it is troublesome. A company doing business in 48 states must be licensed
in each of those states and must comply with the requirements of each." Id. at 8-9.
In reference to the problem of federal versus state control, he says: "The chief
threat to the continuance of state regulation comes from the low standards of regu-
lation and the lax or inefficient methods of supervision of some states." Id. at 6. This
is a particularly difficult problem where companies advertise and solicit business from
persons in states where they are not licensed to do business. The states "have as yet
found no effective way to protect their residents against such practices." Id. at 6.
According to the NASD, VALIC will "receive and process applications received by
mail direct from an applicant" in those states in which it is not licensed. NASD's brief
5, SEC v. VALIC, 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959).
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VALIC DECISION.*
CHARLES T. SHEA t
T HE SUPREME COURT'S 1959 VALIC decision' concludes at
least one pleasant speculation, that variable annuity contracts
issued by insurance companies, and the insurance companies which
issue them, are not amenable to regulation by the SEC. Speaking
for the majority, Justice Douglas held that the variable annuity con-
tract issued by VALIC - the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Com-
pany - was a "security" within the meaning of the Securities Act of
1933,2 and that the company was an "investment company" within
the meaning of the Investment Company Act of 1940.' The exemp-
tions4 found in both Acts for "insurance" and "insurance companies"
did not apply to VALIC or its product, said the Court. Hence the
conclusion that the SEC had jurisdiction to regulate.
The difficult and thorny problem which the SEC now comes to is
how it ought to regulate a company organized and chartered not as an
"investment company" but as an insurance company. A part of the
problem obviously is how to fit the company's product - a retirement
income contract, personal to its holder and which dies with him - into
a regulatory pattern geared to marketable securities, fungible shares
evidencing a property interest. The problem is raised specially by
VALIC's and EALIC's applications for exemption from provisions
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, on which the SEC has as
yet in December, 1959, not ruled.
Before coming to that question, a preliminary look at the variable
annuity and at the structure and modus operandi of VALIC and
its twin, EALIC,5 is probably required.
* The author takes this opportunity to thank Vincent L. Broderick, Esq., Counsel
for National Association of Investment Companies for making available the Official
Record of Hearings before the SEC in the matter of VALIC and EALIC, and
supplying copies of briefs and memoranda filed at those hearings.
t Assistant Counsel, New England Mutual Life Insurance Company. A.B. 1943,
Williams College; LL.B. 1950, Harvard University.
1. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959). The decision
will be referred to in the text of this discussion as the VALIC case.
2. 79 Sup. Ct. 619, 623 (1959).
3. Ibid.
4. Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (a) (8) ; §§ 3 (c) (3),
2 (a) (17), Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a (3) (c)
(3), 80a (2) (a) (17).
5. The Equity Annuity Life Insurance Company. EALIC's product is funda-
mentally the same as VALIC's. The SEC proceeded against EALIC at the same
time as it proceeded against VALIC; the actions were heard together and decided
in the VALIC case.
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The variable annuity, like most other things, can be more easily
understood by comparing it with something which it is not, in this
case, a "conventional" annuity. The conventional annuity promises the
holder a series of fixed, periodic payments, specific in amount, con-
tinuing for life or some shorter period.' In substance, the insurer
accepts a principal sum from the annuitant, and undertakes to liquidate
it completely over the period, paying the annuitant level, equal amounts,
consisting partly of principal and partly of income upon the balance of
principal from time to time remaining.7 The initial calculation, which
determines how much each level payment will be, depends on three
factors: the amount of principal involved, the assumed earnings rate,
and the period of time over which payments are to continue. The in-
surer assumes the investment risk, i.e., that its earnings will not be as
great as the rate it assumed in making its calculation. It also assumes
a mortality risk: if the annuity is for life, the insurer takes the risk
that the annuitant will outlive the mortality predicted for him.
The variable annuity differs from the conventional annuity in that
the insurer's promise is not to pay a specified number of dollars
on each periodic payment date, but to pay instead the then value of a
fixed, specified number of "units" which is a reporting device purely.
The variable annuity assumes the same mortality risk as the con-
ventional annuity, if payments are to continue for life, but cannot be
said to assume the investment risk, i.e., that the dollar value of principal
will remain intact, or that earnings will equal any particular rate. As
earnings exceed the interest assumption the insurer made in writing the
contract, or as there is capital appreciation, the value of the units
increases and so does each periodic payment, and the converse is also
true. The end result is a series of fluctuating payments, which re-
flect the rise or fall of earnings and the rise or fall in the value of
the investments underlying the contract.'
During the premium paying (or "pay-in") period, the purchaser
of the variable annuity assumes the same kind of investment risk
as he does during the benefit (or "pay-out") period: his premium
remains the same throughout the pay-in period, but the number of
"accumulation units" which he purchases with each premium payment
depends upon the value of the insurer's investments at the time of
premium payment.9 During the pay-in period the purchaser is more
6. VANCE ON INSURANCE 1020 (3d ed. 1951).
7. Ibid.
8. See Morrisey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuity, 35 HARV. Bus. Rzv. 75
(1957).
9. For a general discussion see Mearns, The "Securities" Concept: Variable
Annuities, 45 VA. L. REv. 831, 833-38 (1959), and Morrisey, note 8 supra.
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than anything else buying a pro rata share in an invested fund, and the
value of the interest he acquires with each purchase varies with the
value of the investment portfolio.
From what has been said, the hybrid character of the variable
annuity is clear enough. Once the insurance feature - the assumption
of mortality risk - is eliminated, there remains a pure "security."
However, the critical point is that under the VALIC-EALIC con-
tract, the insurance feature is central to the plan. The entire object
and purpose of the contract is to provide a retirement income vehicle
incorporating an absolute guarantee against the contingency that the
payee will outlive his capital resources. Given the mortality element, it
is also clear why VALIC and EALIC chose to organize as insurance
companies. It was the only course open to them under the District of
Columbia's statute, and very probably, it would have been the only
course open to them had they organized in any other jurisdiction.
That result follows because the business of issuing contracts based on
life contingencies and mortality risks is the business of insurance, and
non-insurance companies are disabled, as a matter of state law, from
engaging in that business.1
It is against that background that the SEC must regulate. At
this writing the central question is to what extent can or ought the
Commission to disregard the insurance character of the transaction
and its contractual nature and assimilate VALIC and VALIC's product
to the product of an open-end management company.1
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933.
The Securities Act of 193312 presents no fundamental difficulties,
and it is not here that the problem arises of whether to force some basic
readjustment of the insurance features of the contract. The central
provision of the act - section 5 - prohibits the issue of securities
unless the issuer has filed a registration statement with the Com-
mission, and unless the purchaser of those securities is furnished a
prospectus which adequately describes the nature of the security and of
the issuer's business.' The purpose of the act is to force disclosure,
10. In a number of states, by statute, the issue of annuity contracts is compre-
hended within definitions of what constitutes the business of "life insurance." For
a typical statute, see N.Y. INs. LAW § 46. The same results have been reached
elsewhere by case law. The question is apparently open in some jurisdictions.
11. As the concurring opinion in the VALIC decision points out (79 Sup. Ct. at
629, 633 n.34) there are compelling analogies. There are similarities too, however,
to "Face Amount Certificate" companies and to "Unit Investment Trusts." See the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a (4) (1), (4) (2)
(1940).
12. 48 STAT. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933).
13. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5-8 and Schedule A.
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thus putting in the purchaser's hands enough information to enable
him to act intelligently. 14 Informed judgment is the objective. The
requirements for a registration statement and a prospectus can be met
by VALIC in the same way as they are now met by open-end invest-
ment trusts which are continuously offering new shares: by periodic
refiling and up-dating of the prospectus.1 5 These requirements are
singularly apposite, considering the nature of VALIC's contract. As
has been noted earlier in this discussion, during the pay-in period,
the interest of the variable contract holder closely resembles that of the
mutual fund share purchaser who is buying his shares under a long-
term periodic payment plan. The former can "surrender"; the latter can
"redeem." With each level payment both are purchasing a share in an
underlying portfolio of securities whose value fluctuates. There are
distinctions in status between the two, of course, but the similarities are
more significant than the differences. Both are more nearly "investors"
than anything else, and that suggests that the disclosure provisions which
are appropriate for the true security are likewise appropriate for the
hybrid.
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940.
The Investment Company Act of 19406 is a different proposition,
and it is here that we come to basic questions of whether and to what
extent the insurance features of the VALIC contract are incompatible
with the regulatory framework devised for investment securities. The
most fundamental question under the act is the extent to which the
variable contract is to be considered a "share of stock," and like such
a contract's closest counterpart under the 1940 act, rendered immune
from all risks which are non-investment in character. The problem is
directly created by the insurance features of the variable contract, i.e.,
the indigenous mortality risk in any annuity contract based on life
contingencies, and the additional mortality risk created by some of the
VALIC contracts, which incorporate conventional decreasing term
life insurance in specified dollar amounts. Both of these insurance
risks, it will be remembered, are assumed by the insurer, not the
variable contract holder. Hence the problem, for under traditional
14. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 83-84 (1951).
15. See Motley, Jackson and Barnard, Federal Regulation of Investment Com-
panies Since 1940 63 HARV. L. REv. 1134, 1143 (1950).
16. 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1940). As an aside, it should perhaps be noted
that investment companies are required to register both under the Securities Act of
1933 and under the Investment Company Act of 1940. As a practical matter, a
company accomplishes registration under the 1933 Act by what amounts to up-dating
information furnished in its registration under the 1940 Act.
SPRING 1960]
23
Jones: A Discussion and Analysis of the Valic Decision
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
notions of insurance law, those claims are debt claims upon all of the
assets of the insurer. 17 In simplest terms, all of the insurer's assets
stand as surety for the payment of the risks it has assumed, and in
the variable annuity contract that means at once the creation of a
species of debt claims which are senior to the equity elements of the
contract. Those mortality claims can be considered "senior securities,"
which are prohibited for open-end companies under the act.' 8
Concretely, the variable contract holder's interest, both during the
pay-in period and during the benefit-paying period, is subject to
diminution if the insurer's mortality experience differs widely from
what the insurer assumed when it made the contract. VALIC's con-
tract carries conventional decreasing term life insurance on premium
payers during the early years of the pay-in period. As an extreme case,
if all of those insureds were annihilated in a catastrophe of some kind,
the gap between dollar insurance reserves and cash claims for insur-
ance death benefits could be made up only from the insurer's remaining
assets, i.e., surplus plus the assets funding annuity contracts then in the
benefit-paying stage. Similarly, if large numbers of annuitants outlived
their predicted mortality, the gap between expected and actual mor-
tality would have to be made up from the interests of other annuitants
and, more remotely, from the assets standing behind contracts then
still in the pay-in stage.
Regardless of whether the risk is large or small that either of those
events could occur, it is evident that it is a risk of some kind. Bearing
in mind the purpose of the 1940 act to insulate mutual fund shareholders
from all risks save those inherent in investment judgment, the problem
then becomes one of the degree of protection needed for the variable
contract holder and how to provide it. There are several possible
answers. One proposed by the SEC in the early fall of 1959 entailed
a multi-corporate structure: one corporation to handle funds collected
during the pay-in period, a second to handle funds during the pay-out
period, a third, a conventional insurance company, to accept the mor-
tality risks, and perhaps a fourth to handle compensation of agents and
employees. The advantages of this arrangement are evident, provided
one's aim is to to re-create the VALIC-EALIC contract in the mold
and fashion of a "security" and to incorporate the same or approximately
17. Broadly speaking, insurance contracts, including annuities, are promises
to pay money; they are debt claims, conditional only upon the occurrence of specified
events. The promise to pay would be less than the guarantee required 'by state
statutes if the promisees or some of them could be remanded only to a particular
fund for the satisfaction of their claims.
18. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (18) (f)
1940.
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the same protections for the security element that the 1940 act affords.
Its logical flaw is that it assumes that the insurance features are not
integral to the plan, and then proceeds to the next stage, which
is to prevent the twain from ever meeting. As a solution, it would
assure that the variable contract would forever remain a dog's breakfast
of disparate patches and pieces, neither "insurance" nor "investment"
nor a combination of both. The incongruity becomes obvious when it is
remembered that both the majority and the concurring opinions in the
VALIC decision tell us that the fact of federal regulation does not
import that an admittedly new form must be stuffed into an existing
pattern or not at all. 19
A second solution is one suggested by VALIC and EALIC as a
counter to the multi-corporate proposal. It entailed (1) reinsurance
of the mortality risk present in the decreasing term life coverage
present under some of the VALIC-EALIC contracts, and (2) on
VALIC's part it entailed an effort to demonstrate that, because of
VALIC's conservative mortality assumptions, there was no practical
risk that the effect of adverse mortality during the benefit-paying
period could ever be so gross as to impair the interests of the contract
holders.2" As an expedient, the first part of this proposal has superficial
appeal. It loses all logical appeal when it is remembered that if these
risks are reinsurable, they could have been written separately and in
another company in the first place; ergo, why not require them to be
thus from the beginning? That puts us back with the first solution
which entails complete divorce of the insurance elements from the
equity or investment elements. Further, the second part of the solution
is inconsistent with the first. If there is a risk that adverse mortality
in the pay-out phase will impinge upon the interests of the contract
holders, why is that a less acute risk than the pure life insurance risk?
Why not require both the life insurance risk and the annuity mortality
risk to be reinsured if they are an insurance risk which can be measured?
The answer to both questions is that it would do fundamental violence to
the distinguishing feature of VALIC and EALIC. Both are insurance
companies and both issue contracts containing a basic insurance ele-
ment, i.e., a mortality risk. If that is eliminated there is little visible
reason to issue the contract as an insurance contract or for an insurance
company to issue it, for the insurance features are gone.
19. See 79 Sup. Ct. at 622, 633 (1959).
20. See VALIC's amended application pursuant to § 6 (c) of the 1940 act for
exemptions from the act, p. 23. (In the Matter of The Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Company of America, S.E.C. Docket No. 812-1244.)
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A third possible solution has been suggested in testimony before
the SEC.2 It entails segregation of all of the assets dedicated to the
variable contract, and unlike the present New Jersey segregated fund
variable annuity statute,22 contemplates that none of those assets are
to be chargeable with the mortality risk inherent in the contract. In
effect, that solution envisages reinsurance of the mortality risk, but
inside the same insurance company rather than outside. This proposal
has the practical disadvantage from an insurance company's stand-
point of requiring basic enabling legislation not only in the insurer's
state of domicile, but in each state where it proposes to issue variable
contracts 28 for the "segregated fund" concept is basically alien to in-
surance law. However, the solution preserves in all important respects
the integrity of the contract first offered by VALIC and EALIC.
Moreover, it sharpens the distinction between the "insurance" element
and the "investment" element, and what is more important. meets
fully, in this writer's opinion, the protective standards embodied in the
Investment Company Act of 1940.
However palatable that approach may be, the fourth and the
most obvious alternative is to grant an exemption from section 18 of
the 1940 act to the extent necessary to permit all mortality risk to
remain technically senior to the underlying interests of the contract
holders, and without reinsuring to any greater extent than common
practice in the insurance industry dictates.24  That is defensible on
the ground that the "insurance" element in the contract must be pre-
sumed to be adequately funded and to all intents and purposes without
risk to the contract holder. The actuarial assumptions used in the
21. Id. para. 17, p. 15, and see OFFICIAL REPORT of the proceedings before the
SEC on that application at 218-19.
22. N.J. Laws, ch. 123 (1959).
23. The problem is one of obtaining authority in a given state to do two
things: (1) to issue contracts with a conventional insurance element which have
a claim on something less than all of the assets of the insurer, and (2) to issue con-
tracts wherein the conventional insurance element is severed from all other elements.
This latter item of course raises the question of whether a company issuing such
contracts is an "insurance" company at all and whether its product is "insurance."
It is readily, conceivable that such company organized in state A with appropriate
power to segregate would be treated as an "insurance" company there and regulated
as such, and at the same time be treated as an "investment" company in state B,
and regulated as such there. Pending such enabling legislation, the company might
well be denied entry to do business by state C, on the ground that it was an
"insurance" company proposing to do a non-insurance business.
24. Recently formed companies customarily reinsure some specified percentage
of all new life insurance business to protect themselves against the risk inherent
in having only a relatively few insured lives to deal with. In addition, most com-
panies, regardless of size, reinsure that portion of any given policy which exceeds the
company's limits of retention. Further, many companies reinsure a portion of all
of their substandard cases. Probably no company reinsures annuity contracts, though
most companies will decline to issue an annuity contract on a single life in excess of
some specified limit. The limits vary from company to company.
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VALIC and EALIC contracts, and the reserves behind those assump-
tions, are precisely the same as in the case of insurance companies
issuing conventional contracts. It is true that there is a "risk" that
those mortality assumptions will prove wrong, but the mathematical
probability, and perhaps even the mathematical certainty, is that they
will not. On that basis it can be said with practical certainty that there
is no "risk" to the variable contract holder from adverse mortality,
and the way to properly recognize that fact is to permit the insurance
feature to remain where VALIC and EALIC put it, as an integral
part of their contracts and of their funding scheme. To do other-
wise immediately transforms the variable annuity into something it
was not before, for by isolating the investment element, one creates
thereby a true "security." That is fundamentally at odds with the
notion of the variable annuity contract as originally conceived, and it
is fundamentally at odds with the notion that variable annuities are
properly issued by life insurance companies.
This issue - of whether the security element must in any and
all events be divorced from other elements - is the central one and
the one which carries the most important consequences. There are
however a number of other difficult problems under the 1940 act, and
they deserve mention, however summary, in a discussion of this kind.
The first arises under section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act of
1940.
SHAREHOLDERS AND VOTING RIGHTS.
Section 18(i) of the 1940 act prohibits a registered investment
company from issuing non-voting stock, and requires all shares to have
equal voting rights. It is a requirement which plagued VALIC and
EALIC, and will create the same problems for any stock life insurance
company which proposes to issue variable contracts. Likewise, it
will plague mutual life insurance companies for some of the same
reasons.
The problem the stock company faces 'is obvious: the interests
of the variable contract holders are "shares of stock" within 18(i), if
we subscribe to Justice Brennan's views. 25 Consequently, they must
be given the right to vote on some approximate parity with any out-
standing conventional common or preferred stock the company has.
VALIC and EALIC met that problem by asking for an exemption
from the section, on condition that they would award voting rights to
25. See 79 Sup. Ct. at 632, 633, n. 34 (1959).
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the variable contract holders in accordance with their financial stake
in the enterprise at the time of voting. The suggested plan gave each
variable contract holder (other than holders of group contracts) as
many votes as the cash surrender value of his contract (valued as of
the time of the vote) would purchase of voting common.26 VALIC
also asked for exemption from the section to the extent necessary to
enable it to comply with the mandate of the District of Columbia
statute - organic corporate law for both VALIC and EALIC - that
the holders of group contracts were to be permitted but one vote each.27
It seems a foregone conclusion that the SEC will grant the exemption
asked for even though it denies any semblance of voting parity to
group contract holders. The plan as proposed possesses the positive
virtue of conferring voting powers on the majority of contract holders
on a workable, equitable basis, and in doing so it complies substantially
with one basic purpose of the act, i.e., to assure "shareholders" an
adequate voice in deciding questions of basic corporate policy.28
Mutual companies will not have the problem of producing voting
parity as between variable contracts and outstanding voting stock. They
may, however, if they are organized in some jurisdiction other than
the District, have great difficulty in producing parity as among variable
contract holders and among these contract holders vis-k-vis holders
of conventional annuity contracts and life insurance policies. A number
of state insurance statutes limit the voting rights of group contract
holders just as the District's does, but more importantly, there are
provisions in some state statutes to the effect that each domestic
mutual company policyholder has but one vote.2 9 Under statutes in
other states, voting rights are granted to policyholders not on the
basis of the reserve value of the contract but in terms of face amount
of insurance."0 For annuity holders the formula is sometimes based
on the dollar amount of annuity income the contract will produce."
When the VALIC proposal under 18(i) is stirred in with these re-
quirements and applied to a company which is actively issuing both
variable annuity contracts and a considerable volume of conventional
life insurance and conventional annuities, the prospects are dismaying,
26. See VALIC's amended application, note 20 supra.
27. D.C. CoDm ANN. § 35-525 (1951). Though it can be argued that the section
applies only to policies issued by mutual companies, it appears clear that it must apply
to all group contracts issued by any insurance company, including a stock insurance
company.
28. See Loss, SCURIrIES REGULATION 100 (1951).
29. For example: N.Y. INS. LAW § 198 (1), (2) ; WIs. STAT. § 201.04 (3) (Supp.
1957).
30. MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 175, § 94 (1952).
31. Ibid.
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even assuming a segregated fund as the repository of assets relating to
the variable contracts.
32
THE PROBLEM OF SELF-DEALING.
A different set of problems arise under sections 17(a) (3) and
17(d) of the 1940 act. Section 17(a) (3) prohibits any "affiliated
person" or "promoter" of a registered investment company to borrow
from the company. Section 17(d) (and the SEC's rule 17d-1) pro-
hibit a registered investment company from participating in any joint
venture with any "affiliated person" or "principal underwriter." The
objective of these provisions, in fact of section 17 as a whole, was
to prevent self-dealing by investment company management and by
those connected with the underwriting and distribution phases of the
business.33 Absent exemption by the SEC,34 these provisions would
prevent loans to agents, general agents and to employees. That would
be novel and inconvenient for any company accustomed to the common
(and completely proper) pattern of commission advances to agents
which is found in the insurance industry scheme of compensation. Pro-
duction bonuses are also common in the insurance industry, at least for
those companies which do not do business in the state of New York. 5
It should not be disabling or crippling, however, to have to adopt some
different method of compensation if required by the SEC. It may be
noted as an aside that if the supposed danger in allowing loans and
production bonuses is that they may be so excessive as to impinge
upon and perhaps impair the interests of the variable contract holders,
that risk can be eliminated by the same segregated fund solution outlined
above.3 6
32. Assume a mutual life company with authority to issue variable annuities
under a segregated fund of the type mentioned in VALIC's hearing before the SEC,
cited supra note 21. Might it be necessary to provide the variable contract holders
with voting rights based on the respective values of their interests in the segregated
fund, but only with respect to the segregated fund and its operation, plus other
voting rights (the same as those of other policyholders) in the general affairs of
the company? If any such plan is developed, it would logically require separate
management and a separate board of directors for the segregated fund.
33. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 99 (1951).
34. Section 17 (b) authorizes exemption from 17 (a) on a showing by an
applicant that the proposed transaction is "reasonable and fair," that it is consistent
with the company's policies as recited in its registration statement, and that it does
not violate the general purpose of the act. 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (17) (a),(17) (b).
35. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 213 (8) which purports to prohibit such compensation
both in New York and elsewhere. This section is thought to appy to all companies,
domestic and foreign, doing business in New York.
36. This point is emphasized throughout the hearings on VALIC's and EALIC's
application for exemption from section 17. Since preparation of this paper, a bill
has been introduced in Congress to amend the District's Insurance Law and provide
for such segregation. As the writer construes the bill, the "security" element is
severed completely from all mortality risks and from all expenses of every kind.
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CONCLUSION.
This resume is hardly intended to be exhaustive of the areas of
difference between VALIC and EALIC and the SEC nor on the kind
and degree of compliance to be exacted under the 1940 act. In its
amended application to the SEC, 7 VALIC asked for complete or limited
exemption from some eight important sections of the act besides those
mentioned here."8 Those requests all address questions of greater or
lesser difficulty. A reasonable solution for all of them lies in regarding
EALIC and VALIC not as investment companies doing a spurious
insurance business, but as insurance companies doing a mixed insurance-
security business. As insurance companies, all aspects of their operations
are already regulated under a mature and well-considered system. They
should be expected to conform with the requirements of the federal acts
where appropriate to the investment operation, but only after fully con-
sidering the extent to which the purposes of the federal act have already
been satisfied by the organic provisions of the state insurance statute
and by its enforcement in the hands of the state's deputies. What the
SEC will do remains to be seen.
Editor's Note
The SEC's ruling on the issues discussed on this article was
handed down in February, 1960, following preparation of the article.
(SEC, Investment Company Act Release 2978, 25 February 1960).
In most major respects, the requests of VALIC and EALIC for
exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940 were granted
- with modifications of greater or lesser magnitude. Among the
important points covered by the ruling, the "senior securities" problem
under section 18(f) was disposed of by granting an exemption on
condition that the companies reinsure all conventional life and disability
insurance risks with other companies. In addition, VALIC was re-
quired to eliminate an issue of senior stock from its capital structure.
With regard to voting rights under section 18(i), the Commission
approved the plan put forward by VALIC for producing voting
parity as between common stockholders and the holders of variable con-
tracts. However, the Commission apparently regards the variable annuity
as a "security" despite its insurance features. It required VALIC and
EALIC to use securities terminology in place of insurance terminology
in descriptive material and in some instances in the policy itself.
37. See note 20 supra.
38. §§ 7, 8, 9 (a) (2) and (3), 17 (f), 22 (e), 24 (d), 27(a) and (c) (2).
For a discussion of pertinent sections of the 1940 and 1933 acts, see Crichton,
Registration of the Offering of Variable Annuity Contracts, Legal Section, American
Life Convention, 1959.
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